We consider private message transmission (PMT) between two communicants, Alice and Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. Alice and Bob have no shared keys and Eve is computationally unbounded. There is a total of n communicating paths, but not all may be simultaneously accessible to the parties. We let ta, t b , and te denote the number of paths that are accessible to Alice, Bob and Eve respectively. We allow the parties to change their accessed paths at certain points in time during the PMT protocol. We study perfect (P)-PMT protocol families that guarantee absolute privacy and reliability of message transmission. For the sake of transmission rate improvement, we also investigate asymptotically-perfect (AP)-PMT protocol families that provide negligible error and leakage and behave the same as P-PMT families when message length tends to infinity.
Introduction
With the rapid growth of online communication, an increasing number of daily activities are moved to the online world and fall under prying eyes resulting in increasing loss of privacy. Personal data can be under surveillance by various entities. Hackers easily tap into WiFi connections to steal online communication data [9] . There are reported news on security agencies watching civilian communications through routers in the Internet [8] . Given massive computational resources accessible to the adversaries, naïve usage of traditional cryptographic
The author has moved to Nulli Identity Solution Inc., Canada (hahmadi@nulli.com). This work is in part supported by Alberta Innovates Technology Futures. systems for protecting communication in many cases creates a false sense of security rather than real protection [7] . Development of quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm [13] will also render all today's widely used crypto algorithms insecure. The widely known one-time-pad alternative with information-theoretic security requires prior sharing of long keys, which is impractical.
In this paper, we investigate using multiple paths of communication as an alternative resource for providing privacy against a computationally-unbounded eavesdropper. A path may have different realizations such as a network route, a frequency channel in wireless communication, or a fiber strand in fiber-optics. Using path redundancy for security has been considered in the context of secure message transmission (SMT) [5] . The focus of SMT research however has been security against Byzantine active adversaries, an objective which is impossible in many cases of interest where the majority of paths are corrupted. Note that studying active adversaries is not necessary for networks under surveillance.
Our Work: PMT in the Multipath Setting
We consider message transmission over the following abstract communication system with three parties: a message sender Alice, a message receiver Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve. Alice wants to send a message to Bob, without leaking information to computationally-unbounded Eve. There is no shared key between Alice and Bob. The system provides n disjoint paths, but not all paths can be accessed simultaneously: Alice, Bob, and Eve can have access to up to t a , t b , and t e paths at a time, respectively. We assume time is divided into intervals of equal length λ, and the parties can change their accessed paths at the beginning of each time interval. The value of λ is determined by the technological limitations of the parties, esp. Eve, in switching between paths.
We refer to this problem as private message transmission (PMT) in the (n, t a , t b , t e , λ)-multipath setting. We provide formal definitions of PMT protocols in this setting. Foremost, we are interested in necessary and sufficient connectivity conditions, under which PMT is possible. But we do not stop here. We study how to attain the so-called secrecy capacity, i.e., highest possible rate (message bits divided by communicated bits). The study of secrecy capacity and optimal constructions is essential due to bandwidth limitations and communication cost in most practical scenarios.
AP-secrecy capacity C ∼0 as the highest achievable rates by P-PMT and AP-PMT families. We start our investigation in full-access case (when t a = t b = n), and then extend the study to the general case.
PMT Results. Our precise results on P-PMT and AP-PMT protocols are rather complex (see Section 5) . For the sake of a quick overview, we provide in Table 1 an approximation of these results for sufficiently large λ. Section 6 gives details about why assuming large λ is plausible. Table 1 . PMT conditions and capacities in the (n, ta, t b , te, λ)-multipath setting
Full Access
Partial Access One-way Two-way One-way Two-way
In the full-access case, P-PMT and AP-PMT behave the same in rate and connectivity condition. This result is not surprising: When t e = n, Eve can collect all data communicated over the paths to retrieve the message. Conversely when t e < n, message is divided into n shares and sent such that n − t e shares remain private, implying the secrecy rate of 1− te n . We show that relaxing security to asymptotically-prefect does not change the results. Surprisingly however, in the case of partial-access, AP-PMT shows a huge advantage. P-PMT protocols cannot exceed rate [1 − te t ab ] + , with t ab = min{t a , t b }, whereas it is possible to get rates close to 1 − te n through AP-PMT. To appreciate this advantage more, consider cases where Alice and Bob possess poor connectivity, but Eve has access to almost all paths (i.e., t a , t b t e ≈ n): While P-PMT is clearly impossible, one may take the benefit of positive-rate AP-PMT protocols.
We introduce one-round and two-round AP-PMT schemes to prove our APsecrecy rates. The schemes consist of two primitive blocks, namely a (low-rate) key establishment block followed by a (high-rate) coordinated (keyed) PMT block. The former allows the parties to share a secret key and the latter allows them to use the secret key for high rate message transmission.
Practical Consideration.
To show the practical relevance of our results, we elaborate on two example scenarios of communication over multiple-frequency links and multiple-route networks and show private communication is achieved at rates 17% and 20%, respectively. This provides a novel attempt to build optimalrate communication with information-theoretic privacy in these scenarios.
Secrecy Rates and Multipath Setting Parameters.
Although it may not be clearly from Table 1 , precise secrecy rates of P-PMT and AP-PMT (see Section 5) depend on all multipath setting parameters (n, t a , t b , t e , λ). Here are a few words on how the rates are affected generally by these parameters. First, all secrecy rates are functions of path ratios ta n , t b n , and te n : As long as these three values are not changed increasing/decreasing the total number n of paths does not affect the derived rates. Next (and intuitively), the rates are improved by allowing Alice and Bob higher connectivity (increasing ta n and t b n ) and are decreased when Eve obtains higher connectivity ( te n is increased). Finally, having longer time intervals (larger λ) results in better rates: The reason is larger λ implies that Alice and Bob can send more information before Eve switches her accessed paths.
Related Work and Discussion
Secure Message Transmission. In secure message transmission (SMT) [5] , Alice and Bob are connected by n paths, out of which t ≤ n can be corrupted by the active adversary, Eve. The objective is to guarantee privacy and reliability of a transmitted message. Our study of PMT deviates in a few directions from SMT. Firstly, we focus on passive attacks and study capacity-achieving constructions. Note that a great portion of threats to online communication are passive and using immediate SMT results is an over-design with sub-optimal solutions.
Secondly, SMT assumes Alice and Bob can use all n paths. In dense networks or wide-band frequency channels however, there are more communication paths than parties can possibly afford access. We address this by allowing partial access for Alice and Bob. Last but not least, there is no concept of time interval in SMT, i.e., Alice and Bob can communicate arbitrarily many bits (in a round) without Eve switching her corrupted paths. In a real-life scenario however, Eve may switch paths if enough time is provided. We capture this by adding a time-interval length parameter λ to our abstract model. A SMT protocol that transmits more than λ bits in one round without accounting for Eve's movements is not necessarily functional in our new model. Note that the last two differences cause our study to be more general than SMT.
Frequency Hopping. Frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) is a communication technique which transmits data as a sequence of blocks sent over pseudorandom frequency channels. The technology has appeared in early WiFi and Bluetooth applications to enhance resistance against interference and narrow-band noise, and more recently, to countermeasure jamming-based denial of service (DoS) attacks [15] . FHSS originally requires share keys between the communicants. Strasser et al. [14] introduced keyless or uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) for jamming-resistant key establishment. Although UFH provides "jamming resistance" security without share keys, its security relies on higher-layer cryptography, which implies two drawbacks: (i) the need for a public-key infrastructure and (ii) only computational security guarantees. Looking at a different objective, our PMT results show the possibility of private communication over multiple-frequency channels. In contrast to UFH, the PMT guarantees (i) do not rely on higher-layer cryptography, and (ii) provide security against computationally-unlimited adversaries.
Notation. For real value x, we denoted [x] + = max{0, x}. For two random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y, we denote their statical distance by SD(X, Y ) = 0.5 x∈X | Pr(X = x) − Pr(Y = x)|. Throughout, we use (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) as multipath setting parameters, and let t ab = min(t a , t b ) and Δ = 2
We consider Δ to be negligible for our numerical analysis by assuming large λ.
Preliminaries: Ramp and Quasi-ramp Secret Sharing
A secret sharing scheme (SSS) distributes a secret S among a set of m players such that every "qualified" subsets can reconstruct S, while no information is leaked to an "unqualified" subset. The scheme is defined by a pair (Share, Rec) of functions: Share maps secret S to shares X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m ) and Rec maps shares X = (X 1 , . . . , X m ) to a secret reconstructionŜ. A (k, m)-threshold SSS [12] distributes the secret via m shares such that any ≥ k shares are qualified and any ≤ k − 1 shares are unqualified. A (k, r, m)-ramp SSS extends the above (to r = 1) such that any ≥ k shares are qualified and ≤ k − r shares are unqualified, and information leakage increases by the number of shares.
Polynomial-based ramp SSS. The simplest (k, r, m)-ramp SSS is Shamir's polynomial-based construction [12] denoted by (Share pol , Rec pol ) and described below. Define integer p ≥ m + r and let S = (S 0 , . . . , S r−1 ) ∈ F r p be the secret. Algebraic-geometric Quasi-ramp SSS. The polynomial-based ramp SSS requires m + r ≤ p since there is only p points on the polynomial. Algebraicgeometric constructions relax this requirement by using curves of high genus.
Garcia and Stichtenoth [6, Theorem 3.1] show an explicit family of curves with arbitrary genus g and ( √ p − 1)g many points over F p (when p is a square). Chen and Cramer [3] use these curves to construct an algebraic geometric (k, r, g, m)quasi-ramp SSS for any m < ( √ p−1)g shares. A Quasi-ramp SSS allows ≥ k+2g shares to be qualified and any ≤ k − 1 shares to be unqualified.
(k, r, g, m)-quasi-ramp SSS (Share alg , Rec alg ). Let C be a Garcia-Stichtenoth curve with genus g over F p , where p is a square and ( √ p−1)g ≥ m+r. Define Q, P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P m+r−1 as any m+r+1 distinct rational points on C, D = (k+2g).(Q) as a rational divisor of C, and L(D) as the Riemann-Roch space associated with
. . , X m ) chooses the first k + 2g present shares: If not possible, returns ⊥); otherwise, obtains f (.) through linear interpolation and returns S = (f (0), f(1), . . . , f(r − 1)).
The above SSS allows for more shares at the price of increasing the gap between the number of qualified and unqualified players. If field size p is large enough, one can generate √ p − 1 additional shares by allowing only 2 players gap in SSS. We use this interesting property in our PMT constructions which let p = 2 λ , for time-interval length λ.
Problem Description

Multipath Setting Abstraction
A multipath setting refers to an abstract communication system which consists of n disjoint communication paths, out of which at most t a , t b , and t e can be simultaneously accessed by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. More precisely, time is divided into equal-length intervals each of which corresponds to λ bits of communication over at least one path. In the beginning of a time intervals, the parties choose their access paths and will hold on to their choice till the end of that interval, i.e., until λ bits are communicated over a path. This abstraction of time intervals in bits is obtained by multiplying the bit-transmission speed by path switching time. The value of λ depends on how fast the communicants and (more importantly) Eve can release old paths and capture new paths without possibly missing the live communication. This relates to the actual communication scenario, the communication capability of devices, and the transmission speed. We shed more light on this in Section 6: The practical scenarios considered there suggest typical values of λ > 100. To summarize, a multipath setting is defined by five public parameters (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) and we denote t ab = min(t a , t b ) throughout. When t ab = n, we refer to the setting as the (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting. Figure 1 illustrates full-access versus partial-access settings.
(a) Full-access: ta = t b = n.
(b) Partial-access: ta, t b ≤ n. Fig. 1 . Full-access vs. partial-access multipath settings
PMT protocol and Secrecy Capacity: Definition
To deliver message S from Alice to Bob, a PMT protocol makes them communicate sequences of data so that Bob can obtain an estimateŜ. The protocol leaves Eve with some view V iew E (S) of the communication. The randomness in V iew E (.) comes from the PMT protocol and the adversary.
Definition 1 (PMT Protocol).
A protocol Π over a multipath setting is a (k, c, δ, )-PMT protocol if it transmits any k-bit message using c bits of communication such that
In practice, the message length may be unknown beforehand and one needs a family of PMT protocols for arbitrarily long messages. PMT families are desired to have a guaranteed rate for any message length. We refer to this guaranteed rate as the secrecy rate of the family. 2 When δ = = 0, F is called a perfect (P)-PMT family and the P-secrecy rate is denoted by R F :0 .
Definition 2 ((δ, )-PMT and P-PMT Families
Designing P-PMT families is crucial for highly-sensitive data transmission. There are however scenarios which desire non-zero yet negligible δ and . We define asymptotically-perfect (AP)-PMT families with (δ, )-PMT protocols, such that the values δ and tend to zero for longer messages.
Definition 3 (AP-PMT Family). An AP-PMT family F for a multipath set-
We accordingly define the secrecy capacity of a multipath setting as the highest secrecy rate that can be guaranteed for all message lengths. We are particularly interested in two types of capacities.
Definition 4 (Secrecy Capacity). The P-(resp. AP-) secrecy capacity C 0 (resp. C ∼0 ) of a setting S equals the largest P-secrecy (resp. AP-secrecy) rate achievable by all possible P-(resp. AP-) PMT families over S .
Relation among P-secrecy and AP-secrecy Capacities
Definition 1 implies that any (k, c, δ 1 , 1 )-PMT protocol is also (k, c, δ 2 , 2 )-PMT for δ 2 ≥ δ 1 and 2 ≥ 1 . Since families simply consist of protocols, any (δ 1 , 1 )-PMT family is also a (δ 2 , 2 )-PMT family. This shows C 0 ≤ C ∼0 . It is important to know whether the above can be replaced by a strict inequality: It is fairly reasonable to tolerate negligible deviation from perfect security to improve rate or to make PMT possible. Below, we study P-PMT and AP-PMT protocols starting from the full-access case (when t a = t b = n) and extend it to the general multipath setting. Our study leads us the following ultimate conclusion:
For a wide range of settings, it holds C ∼0 > C 0 .
PMT in the Full-access Scenario
In the (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting (i.e., t a = t b = n) with infinite interval length λ = ∞, the PMT problem relates to the SMT work [5] (for passive adversary):
The optimal solution, denoted by F pol 0 , simply uses a polynomial-based (n, r, n)ramp secret sharing scheme (SSS), (Share pol , Rec pol ), where r = n − t e . Let S ∈ F r 2 u be the secret message, for some integer u > log(2n − t e ).
-Alice calculates shares X = (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) = Share pol (S) and sends X i ∈ F 2 u over path i. -Having received X i 's, Bob obtains the message as S = Rec pol (X).
The perfect reliability and secrecy follow trivially from the properties of (n, r, n)ramp SSS: n shares are qualified and n − r = t e shares are unqualified.
gives a family of (u.r, u.n, 0, 0)-P-PMT protocols with rate R F pol 0 = 1 − te n over the (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting with λ = ∞.
P-PMT for Finite λ
When λ is finite, the scheme F pol 0 (without any modification) does not provide us with a P-PMT family since it cannot give P-PMT protocols for message lengths u.r such that u > λ. There is of course an easy fix to this. One can stay with a constant field size 2 λ and instead repeat F pol 0 for sufficiently many times to send arbitrarily long messages; hence, a PMT family. The situation is unfortunate when 2n − t e > 2 λ : F pol 0 cannot provide any PMT protocol since the polynomial-based SSS cannot generate more points than the field size 2 λ . To resolve this, we propose a P-PMT scheme, F alg 0 , that is similar to F P ol 0 but uses the algebraic-geometric SSS of Section 2 with arbitrarily many shares over F 2 λ and transmits message in q time-intervals. In precise, the scheme uses a (qn−2g, r, g, qn)-quasi-ramp SSS (Share alg , Rec alg ) for the secret message S = (S 1 , . . . , S r ) ∈ F r 2 λ : To generate qn + r ≤ ( √ 2 λ − 1)g points, we choose g = q(2n−te) 2 λ/2 −1 and r = q(n−t e )−2g. The reliability and secrecy properties of F alg 0 follow from the quasi-ramp SSS: qn−2g+2g = qn shares are qualified and qn − 2g − r = qt e shares are unqualified. The rate equals R F alg
Proposition 3. The scheme F alg 0 gives a P-PMT family over any (n, t e , λ)-fullaccess setting. The P-secrecy rate of the family is R F alg
Implication to P-secrecy Capacity
The existing work on SMT (cf. [11] ) suggests the upper-bound 1 − te n on achievable P-PMT secrecy rates. This combined with the above results leads us to the following approximation of the P-secrecy capacity for the full-access case:
It remains an interesting theoretical question to close the gap between the two bounds. For practical scenarios (λ > 100), the gap Δ is reasonably small.
AP-PMT in the full-access Case
We are interested in finding whether PMT rates can be improved if reliability or secrecy requirements are relaxed to asymptotically perfect. We already have the trivial lower-bound C FA ∼0 ≥ C FA 0 . To derive an upper-bound, we obtain a bound on (δ, )-secrecy rates and then study its behavior when δ and approach zero. The bound is obtained by relating to (δ, )-secret-key rates for secret-key establishment protocols. The proof is rather technical and is removed due to lack of space. We refer to the full version [2, Section 4.3] for the proof. 
The bounds (4) and (5) show that P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities fall in the same range and will equal 1 − te t ab assuming Δ → 0: We can conclude relaxing security requirements from perfect to asymptotically-perfect does NOT help improve the secrecy rate in the "full-access" case.
PMT in the General Multipath Setting
Unlike full-access, relaxing security to asymptotically perfect benefits PMT in the general setting. We study P-PMT and AP-PMT rates separately.
P-PMT: Capacity and Construction
We derive lower and upper bounds on the P-secrecy capacity in the general (twoway) multipath communication setting that prove C 0 ≈ [1 − te t ab ] + and imply P-PMT impossibility when t e ≥ t ab .
Lower-bound via one-round P-PMT. The lower-bound on C 0 is attained by using one-round PMT schemes, F pol 0 or F alg 0 , over a fixed (hard-coded) set of t ab paths. The constructions promise the rate 1 − te t ab − Δ when t e ≤ t ab (see (4)).
Upper-bound on P-PMT achievable rates. Any (possibly multiple-round) P-PMT protocol in the multipath setting needs to provide "perfect" secrecy, even in the "worst" case when Eve always captures t e of the ≤ t ab communication paths between Alice and Bob. This suggests the maximum rate 1 − t e /t ab stated in the following Lemma. For the proof, we refer to the full version [2, Appendix D].
Theorem 2 concludes the results on P-secrecy capacity.
Theorem 2. The P-secrecy capacity of any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting satisfies [1 − te t ab − Δ] + ≤ C 0 ≤ [1 − te t ab ] + and the lower-bound is achieved by an explicit one-round PMT protocol.
AP-PMT: Capacity and Constructions
Achievable AP-secrecy rates in the general setting cannot be upper-bounded by some similar approach to the full-access case (as in Section 4.2). This leaves us with the trivial upper-bound
At a first look, the upper-bound seems far from tight. It seems impossible to reach secrecy rates up to 1 − te n , regardless of connectivity parameters t a and t b . We prove however that for sufficiently large λ, there are AP-PMT families which can get close to this rate. For one-way multipath setting, the required connectivity condition is t b > t e ; for two-way setting however, AP-PMT is always possible only if t e < n and t a , t b > 0. AP-PMT Approach. We introduce three different AP-PMT schemes for different connectivity ranges. All schemes consist of two primitive blocks: (i) lowrate key establishment block and (ii) high-rate coordinated PMT block. The keyestablishment block lets Alice and Bob share a long secret-key W in q 1 intervals. The coordinated PMT block allows Alice to send her message to Bob in q 2 intervals over the secret paths chosen based on W : Since Eve is unaware of W , the coordinated PMT rate equals (almost) 1 − te n . The overall rate however takes into account the overhead communication for block (i). Both blocks take use of the algebraic-geometric SSS of Section 2.
One-round AP-PMT for t e ≤ t ab . We introduce a one-round AP-PMT scheme F 1 with an AP-secrecy rate close to 1 − te n . The scheme has perfect reliability, but allows for negligible leakage. It composes a key-transport block and a coordinated PMT block as follows. Given the (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting, define w = log n t ab . For arbitrarily small ψ > 0, and sufficiently large
Let (Share alg,1 , Rec alg,1 ) be a (q 1 t ab −2g 1 , r 1 , g 1 , q 1 t ab )-quasi-ramp SSS over F 2 λ used for key transport, and (Share alg,2 , Rec alg,2 ) be a (q 2 t ab − 2g 2 , r 2 , g 2 , q 2 t ab )quasi-ramp SSS over F 2 λ used for coordinated PMT. Let T 0 be a set of fixed (public) t ab paths and S ∈ F r2 2 λ be the message to be transmitted. One-round (0, )-PMT scheme F 1 .
(i) Key transport (q 1 intervals). Alice generates randomly W = (W 1 , . . . , W q2 ) ∈ {0, 1} q2w . She obtains shares X = (X i,j ) 1≤i≤q1,1≤j≤t ab = Share alg,1 (W ) and sends (X i,j ) 1≤j≤t ab over the t ab paths of T 0 in interval 1 ≤ i ≤ q 1 . Having received shares, Bob reconstructs W = Rec alg,1 (X). (ii) Coordinated PMT (q 2 intervals). Alice and Bob calculate path sets T i of size t ab , for 1 ≤ i ≤ q 2 , using key W i ∈ {0, 1} w . Alice calculates message shares Y = (Y i,j ) 1≤i≤q2,1≤j≤t ab = Share alg,2 (S) and sends the part (Y i,j ) 1≤j≤t ab over T i in interval q 1 + i. Having received all shares, Bob reconstructs S = Rec alg,2 (Y ).
Theorem 3.
For any small ψ, > 0, the scheme F 1 gives (0, )-PMT and AP-PMT families over an (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting with t e < t ab ≤ n. The AP-secrecy rate of the scheme equals
and Δ = (2 λ 2 −2 − 0.25) −1 .
3 Here, we assume that q1 is chosen such that w divides r1λ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. It is crucial to use the algebraic-geometric (rather than polynomial) SSS. Expecting arbitrarily small > 0 requires sufficiently many (q 2 t ab ) shares over field of constant size 2 λ .
The rate R F1:∼0 shows rate improvement of AP-PMT compared to P-PMT. The rate is however lower than upper-bound (6) mainly due to the key-transport block communication overhead ξ 1 .
One-round AP-PMT for t e ≥ t ab . The scheme F 1 cannot achieve any positive secrecy rate when t e ≥ t ab . We observe the following two restricting properties of F 1 : (i) it provides perfect reliability, and (ii) it is non-interactive. In this section, we focus on relaxing perfect reliability and introduce a PMT scheme F 2 that only modifies the key-transport block in F 1 : It fixes a larger set T 0 of max(t a , t b ) ≤ n ≤ n (instead of t ab ) paths and requires Alice and Bob to communicate over random subsets of T 0 . This sacrifices the reliability, but allows for pushing the multipath connectivity condition to t e < t b instead of t e < t ab (for scheme F 1 ). F 2 uses same parameters (8) for coordinated PMT, but updates parameters for key transport: It uses the algebraic-geometric (
One-round (δ, )-PMT scheme F 2 .
(i) Key transport (q 1 intervals). Alice generates random W = (W 1 , . . . , W q2 ) ∈ {0, 1} w and shares X = (X i,j ) 1≤i≤q1,1≤j≤ta = Share alg,1 (W ). In each round 1 ≤ i ≤ q 1 , she sends the part (X i,j ) 1≤j≤ta over t a (random) paths from T 0 , and Bob listens over t b (random) paths from T 0 . If Bob's observation X includes less than q 1 t b,1 shares, he aborts and choosesŜ ∈ R F r2 2 λ ; otherwise, he reconstructs W = Rec alg,1 (X ). (ii) Coordinated PMT (q 2 intervals). This is the same as F 1 .
Theorem 4. For any small ψ, δ, > 0, the scheme F 2 gives (δ, )-PMT and AP-PMT families over any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting with t e < t b . The AP-secrecy rate of this scheme reaches
Proving Theorem 4 is similar to Theorems 3. We refer the reader to the full version [2, Appendix F] for the proof.
Remark 2. When t b = n Scheme F 2 can be simplified to achieve a higher rate: Only Stage (i), key-transport, suffices to serve message transmission at rate
Impossibility of One-way PMT for t e ≥ t b . It is impossible to obtain AP-PMT in one-round when t e ≥ t b . The reason any protocol that lets Bob recover the message will let Eve too. For the proof, refer to [2, Appendix G] Proposition 4. When t e ≥ t b , there is no one-round (k, c, δ, ) -PMT protocol of rate R = k c > 2 1−δ−α to transmit k ≥ 3/α bits of messages, implying the AP-secrecy capacity of C ∼0 = 0.
Implication to one-way AP-secrecy capacity.
Putting things together, we reach the following on AP-secrecy capacity of one-way communication.
Corollary 1. For any one-way
(n, t a , t b , t e , λ)-multipath setting, it holds that − → L ∼0 ≤ − → C ∼0 ≤ − → U ∼0 , where − → L ∼0 = ⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ [ 1− te n −Δ 1+min(ξ1,ξ2) ] + , if t e < t ab [ 1− te n −Δ 1+ξ2 ] + , if t ab ≤ t e < t b 0, if t e ≥ t b , − → U ∼0 = 1 − te n , if t e < t b 0, if t e ≥ t b .(10)
AP-PMT: Always Positive Rates via Two-way Communication.
We introduce a two-round AP-PMT scheme F 3 that achieves positive rates even when t e ≥ t b . The idea is using an interactive key-agreement block, instead of key transport. Bob sends random elements over random paths and Alice publicly responds (over a fixed path) which elements she has received. Having shared common elements, Alice and Bob apply privacy amplification to convert them into a secret-key. We use the algebraic-geometric SSS for privacy amplification. Scheme F 3 uses same parameters as F 1 for coordinated PMT (8), but updates paraments for key agreement: It uses the (q 1 t a,1 − 2g 1 , r 1 , g 1 , q 1 t a,1 )-quasi-ramp SSS (Share alg,1 , Rec alg,1 ), where
Two-round (δ, )-PMT scheme F 3 .
(i) Interactive key agreement (q 1 intervals). Bob generates X = (X i,j ) 1≤i≤q1,1≤j≤t b randomly from (F λ 2 ) q1t b . In each interval 1 ≤ i ≤ q 1 , he sends (X i,j ) 1≤j≤t b over t b random paths and Alice listens over t a random paths. If Alice's observation includes < q 1 t a,1 elements from X, she aborts and Bob outputsŜ ∈ R F r2 2 λ ; otherwise, let X A ⊆ X be the first q 1 t a,1 elements observed by Alice over path sets (P i ) 1≤i≤q1 . Alice sends (P i ) 1≤i≤q1 information over a fixed (public) path to Bob. Alice and Bob use X A as shares to calculate W = (W 1 , . . . , W q2 ) = Rec alg,1 (X A ).
(ii) Coordinated PMT (q 2 intervals). This is the same as F 1 .
Theorem 5. For any ψ, δ, > 0, the scheme F 3 gives (δ, )-PMT and AP-PMT families over any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting with t a , t b > 0 and t e < n. The AP-secrecy rate of F 3 equals:
The proof is similar to those for Theorems 3 and 4. We refer the reader to the full version [2, Appendix H].
Implication to two-way AP-secrecy capacity. The capacity is trivially upper-bounded by 1 − te n , unless when t a = 0 or t b = 0. Combining the lower bounds from F 1 , F 2 , and F 3 , we have:
Comparison of P-secrecy and AP-secrecy Rates
We have proved that in partial-access multipath communication, Alice and Bob can achieve higher secrecy rates if they choose AP-PMT protocols over P-PMT ones. To give more sense about how much rate improvement is attained by AP-PMT protocols, we compare the P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities for typical multipath parameters that match practical scenarios. Figure 2 (a) graphs the lower and upper bounds on C ∼0 as well as C 0 for different values of β = te n , assuming λ = 100 and t a = t b = 0.2n. For this value of λ, we approximate Δ ≈ 0 and thus C 0 ≈ 1 − te t ab = 1 − 5β (see Theorem 2) . The capacity C 0 and the bounds L ∼0 and U ∼0 are shown by solid, dotted, and dashed lines, respectively. The graph clearly illustrates the benefit of using AP-PMT: While the lower-bound L ∼0 remains positive throughout, C 0 drops fast and equals 0 for β ≥ 0.2. For β ≤ 0.15, the lower bound L ∼0 is achieved by one-round AP-PMT and is quite close to the upper bound. Outside of this range, the lower-bound corresponds to our two-round scheme F 3 . This is not surprising since one-way AP-PMT is impossible when β ≥ 0.2 (implying t e ≥ t b ). Figure 2 (b) graphs the same three quantities (C 0 , L ∼0 , and U ∼0 ) with respect to α = t ab n , assuming λ = 100, t a = t b , and t e = 0.2n. The gap between the bounds on C ∼0 bridges as we increase α. What causes more gap for small α < 0.25 is small is the two-round AP-PMT communication overhead ξ 3 . Finding a better approximation of the AP-secrecy capacity, especially in the low connectivity regime where t a , t b < t e is recommended as future work.
Practical Consideration
We discuss two practical applications of our PMT results in the multipath setting model, i.e., sending secret data over (i) multiple-frequency links and (ii) multipleroute networks. Both scenarios include a set of paths that connect communicants and can be tapped into by present eavesdroppers.
PMT Using Multiple-frequency Links
Multiple-frequency communication environments, such as wireless and fiberoptics, realize our multipath setting. Our PMT results show the possibility of secure communication, provided that the wiretapper does not have simultaneous access to all frequencies (i.e., t e < n in our setting). The challenge is to design a multiple-frequency system that enforces this property. Existing frequency-hopping solutions do not satisfy this requirement. Bluetooth for example transmits data at speed of 1Mbps over 79 adjacent 1-MHz frequency channels and by the current technology, one can easily capture all the 80-MHz frequency range and store hours of communication in a 1 Terabyte disk.
It is yet possible to design systems that serve our purpose as it is practically infeasible for a single transceiver (and ADC) to deal with wider than 100 MHz ranges [10] . All we need is to use a system whose frequency channels are far apart. Consider for instance a system design that uses n = 70 20-MHz frequencychannels distributed evenly (with 80-MHz distances) over the 57-64 GHz (unlicensed Gigabit WiFi) frequency range. Data transmitted at 100 Mbps speed.
Since there is only one frequency channel in each 100-MHz slot, the eavesdropper would require 70 transceiver blocks to access all 70 channels simultaneously. This is not practical in certain scenarios due to expense concern or space restriction (e.g., stealth attack on indoor communication).
Let us assume legitimate devices use only t a = t b = 4 transceivers, while the wiretapper's device can embed t e = 35 such blocks. The wiretapper may switch between frequencies to learn more information. Fastest frequency synthesizers have switching time around 1μs [1] . Although one may allow longer switching time for legitimate parties, the 1μs time determines λ in our design. At the speed of 100 Mpbs, this gives λ = 10 −6 × 100 × 2 20 = 104 bits, implying a (70, 4, 4, 35, 104)-multipath setting for which the two-round AP-PMT scheme F 3 sends private data at rate 17%. This solution does not require pre-shared keys and provides information-theoretic security.
PMT Using Multiple-route Networks
Multipath routing has been shown [16] to benefit reliable transmission over large networks such as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and the Internet. We study whether the resource can be used to enhance privacy of communication when middle routers can be tapped into. We focus on MANETs. Studies have shown the average number of node-disjoint paths in a moderately-dense (around 500node) MANET is over 10. Consider the following scenario: There are n = 10 paths between the source and destination nodes. The source can send over only t a = 2 paths while the destination receives data through all t b = 10 paths. The adversary's resources allow for compromising at most t e = 8 paths at a time, and at least 1 millisecond is needed to redirect resources to tap into new nodes (and paths); this is quite plausible, noting the technical challenges of tapping into communicating devices. The source transmits data at the speed of 512 Kbps, implying λ = 10 −3 × 512 × 2 10 = 524. This leads to the (10, 2, 8, 10, 524)multipath setting for which the simplified version of scheme F 2 (Block (i) only -see Remark 2) guarantees private transmission at rate 20%.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have derived connectivity conditions for the possibility of P-PMT and AP-PMT in the multipath setting. We also derived lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacities. Although in the full-access case, P-PMT and AP-PMT behave the same, in general, AP-PMT protocols attain strictly higher rates. The maximum rate for P-PMT is [1 − te t ab ] + , whereas AP-PMT protocols can achieves rates close to the upper-bound 1 − te n . The is yet a gap between the proved achievable rates and this upper-bound. Bridging the gap is an interesting question which we leave for future work. Any practical communication system with path diversity can be a case to test the feasibility our PMT results. We considered the real-life scenarios of communication over multiple-frequency links and multiple-route networks. In both cases, we elaborated on how to derive multipath setting parameters and used our results to provide private communication at rates 17% and 20%, respectively. Showing the possibility of keyless communication with information-theoretic privacy is interesting. A followup work can be the design of concrete protocols considering all practical and technical concerns that may have been missing in this work.
